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Abstract
This paper analyzes the effect of public-contest recruitment on earnings by applying an extended
version of the Oaxaca-Blinder model with double selection to microdata on Italy. We find that
the gender pay gap vanishes among public-contest selected employees, and even reverses in favor
of women (-17.4%) in the young sample. The reversal is because public contests are merit-based
and gender-fair screening devices. They are merit-based because selected employees possess
higher productive characteristics than unselected ones, both women and men. They are gender-
fair because the coefficients component in the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition is never significant
among public-contest recruited employees, either with or without selection. On the contrary,
among employees not hired by public contest the gender pay gap is positive and significant
(7.6%), and it is entirely due to coefficients, that is to discrimination in the career path.
Keywords: Gender pay gap; Public-contest recruitment; Double sample selection.
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1 Introduction
There is a big literature on the gender pay gap (GPG) and on its narrowing in recent years (Blau and
Kahn (2003), (2006), (2007), Goldin (2014)). However, there still be large international differences
in the GPG as shown recently by Kahn (2015) who compares the GPG of several countries in the
period 2010 - 2012. While in some developed countries women were close to earnings parity with
men, in others large gaps remained. Many factors may influence the GPG. Among them are skill
supply and demand, unions, and minimum wages, which explain the wage returns to education,
experience, and occupational wage differentials.
Understanding the causes of the gender pay gap can help in evaluating the efficiency of the
labor market. For example, if women earn less than comparably productive men because of dis-
crimination, the gender pay gap reflect a labor market inefficiency in that women’s abilities are not
being fully applied and remunerated in the labor market. More, if the persistence of the gender
pay disparity is because of the occupational segregation, changes in the wage structure are likely
to have an effect on the gender pay gap (see Kahn 2015). However, the direction of the effect is
not clear-cut. From one side, reducing occupational wage differentials may induce men to enter
female-dominated job; from the other side, the effect may be of reducing women’s incentive to
enter male-dominated jobs. Occupational segregation and the stereotypes it creates have strong
influences on career choice also in terms of entry opportunity. Castagnetti and Rosti (2013) iden-
tify specific environments in which the use of stereotypes is expected to be more likely to exert an
influence on performance appraisal and show that the unexplained, i.e. discrimination, component
of the gender pay gap increases or decreases in line with the expected influence of the stereotypes.
In particular, Castagnetti and Rosti (2013) show that the unexplained component of the gender
pay gap is lower among employees hired through open competition than it is among those hired
without open competition.1
In this paper we focus on the impact of public contests as institutional selection mechanism that
may counteract the discrimination mechanism in the hiring process. We argue that public contest,
whose methods of implementation are strictly regulated by law, ensures higher probabilities that
applicants are chosen and rewarded because of differences in their personal characteristics and
not discriminated against. As public contests are by law more regulated and more controlled,
1Dobbs and Crano (2001) show that individuals who have to justify their decisions have a stronger incentive
to bypass their stereotyped impressions than those who do not have to provide justifications. As a consequence,
decision makers are required to justify their choices and describe the criteria they use to evaluate candidates, as in
open competition, they are less likely to discriminate against women.
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less discretionary and less ambiguous than other private methods of performance appraisal, they
can reduce the conditions for gender discrimination to flourish. In public contest, the recruitment
procedure is a combination of examinations, scrutiny of the curriculum and qualifications, in which
the information cannot easily be distorted to fit the stereotypes.
We study the effect of public-contest selection on earnings, and we expect the unexplained
component of the gender gap in pay vanishes among employees hired by public contest. As the
effect of hiring methods are stronger on early-career wages, we focus on young employees and we
expect the gender gap in pay vanishes or even reverses in favor of women, due to their higher
observed characteristics such as education and degree grades (see Castagnetti and Rosti 2009).
Using Italian micro data we empirically confirm our anticipations; recruitment carried out by
public contest makes the gender pay gap vanish among public-contest selected employees, and even
reverses in favor of women (-17.4%) in the young sample. To the best of our knowledge, this is the
first work that shows the reversal of the GPG. Moreover, we show that the public contest selection
mechanism is a gender-fair and merit based selection mechanism; the reversal is entirely explained
by the observable characteristics that are rewarded as men’s one.
We confirm these findings by considering a double sample selection model where both the
decision to be employed and the sectoral choice (recruitment by public contest or not) are taken
into account.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the Public Contest mechanism in Italy.
Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 shows the effects of selection hiring process on earnings.
Section 5 provides evidence on public contests as gender-fair and merit-based selection methods.
Section 6 extends the analysis to a double sample selection model. Section 7 concludes.
2 Public Contest
In the Italian legal framework, the public contest is the institutional process to which the Constitu-
tion explicitly delegates the hiring of public servants, that is the meritocratic selection of aspirants
to public employment positions in both central and local administration (art. 97 of the Constitu-
tion). The methods for the assessment of candidates may be based on presentation of diplomas and
other qualification titles (skills, work experience, publications, etc.) and/or consist of theoretical
and practical tests. All tests must be performed in the presence of the selection board and must be
written and blind. The examination may include an interview consisting of answers to questions
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from members of the Commission. Both questions and answers are recorded in the report prepared
by the secretary of the commission and signed by all members of the board. Public contests are the
recruitment system prevailing in the Public Administration, but private firms can also use them.2
In particular, our sample shows that about 10% of the recruitment in the private sector takes place
by contest (see Table 1).
3 Data
We use microdata on Italy from the 2010 file of the Italian Institute for the Development of
Vocational Training for Workers (Isfol). The data was collected in the context of a joint project
with the Italian Ministry of Labor and Social Policy that was started in 2005, the survey Isfol Plus.
The project aims particularly at creating a data set for the study of wage inequality by gender.
Hence, it delivers broad information on the personal working profiles and individual motivation to
work as well as on the cultural and territorial background of the participants (Centra and Cutillo
2009). Isfol Plus covers the whole population with focus on the working population. The data
was collected by means of Computer Assisted Telephone Interviewing (CATI). One of the main
characteristics of the national survey is that only answers with direct responses were considered,
that is no proxies were used. Isfol Plus 2010 is conducted with 55,000 interviews. In our analysis,
we focus on full-time employees aged between 18 and 64 years. Part-time workers are excluded
from the sample as they have a larger dispersion in pay than their full-time colleagues, what raises
the probability of earning less than the average hourly wage. Moreover, women have a significantly
higher fraction of part-time work than men. Similarly, autonomous workers are not considered
in the study, as the focus in this paper is employees’ selection mechanisms, but self-employed are
unselected or, if selection takes place in the form of an entrance examination as to notaries, the aim
pursued is not to fill job vacancies but to ensure the citizens on the quality of the services provided.
The analysis is also constrained to earnings from the main job only, i.e. from the job that yields
the highest income. As only 2.4% of the sample have more than one job, this restriction is unlikely
to be important. Last, we exclude all individuals with disabilities (2.8%). The selection criteria
yielded a sample size of 17,275 of which 9.033 were female (52.3%) and 8,242 were male employees
(47.1%). Out of this sample there were 9,787 employed individuals, 5,397 men (55.1%) and 4,390
women (44.9%). In the data, 1,485 male (27.5%) and 1,718 female (39.1%) employees entered via
2In this case, the company agrees to comply with the rules that represent the essential elements of the procedure;
otherwise it must compensate the damage (art. 1218 Civil Code).
4
public contest in their current job. Table 1 reports mean and standard deviation for some of the
controls that are included in our analysis.
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Selection by Public Contest Selection not by Public Contest
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Net Hourly Wage 12.790 34.828 8.624 14.168
Women 0.536 0.499 0.406 0.491
Age 48.458 10.671 36.598 12.649
Children 0.716 0.451 0.405 0.491
Experience 20.375 11.516 11.043 13.014
Tenure 15.729 11.66 5.682 10.996
Northern Region 0.393 0.488 0.536 0.499
Metropolitan Area 0.340 0.470 0.258 0.438
Education 15.039 3.265 13.000 3.499
University Degree 0.466 0.499 0.225 0.418
High School 0.459 0.498 0.553 0.497
Primary Education 0.002 0.047 0.016 0.126
Secondary Education 0.073 0.260 0.206 0.404
Occupation
Managers 0.393 0.488 0.161 0.368
Intermediate professions 0.338 0.473 0.231 0.422
White-collar workers 0.201 0.401 0.308 0.462
Service Sector 0.968 0.177 0.712 0.453
Big Firm 0.088 0.283 0.42 0.494
Public Firm 0.905 0.293 0.159 0.365
Private Firm 0.095 0.293 0.841 0.365
Observations 3,203 6,584
On average, workers hired by public contest have higher salaries, more experience and have
more frequently achieved a university degree while the other employees have more often reached a
high school education only. Our data show that the selection by public contest is not a prerogative
of the public sector; about 10% of the recruitment in the private sector takes place by contest.
4 The Effect of Public-Contest Selection on Earnings
The unadjusted GPG3 is a key indicator used within the European employment strategy to monitor
imbalances in wages between men and women. The Eurostat data show that in 2010 the GPG is
estimated to be 16.2% in the EU as a whole, and 5.3% in Italy.4 In our dataset the gender gap in
3The unadjusted gender pay gap provides an overall picture of gender inequality in hourly pay. This gap represents
the difference between the average gross hourly earnings of men and women expressed as a percentage of average gross
hourly earnings of men. It is called unadjusted as it does not take into account all of the factors that influence the
gender pay gap, such as differences in education, labour market experience or type of job (Eurostat 2015).
4The GPG indicator is calculated within the framework of the data collected according to the methodology of the
Structure of Earnings Survey - NACE Rev. 2. The population consists of all paid employees in enterprises with 10
employees or more (Eurostat 2014).
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hourly wages among full time employees is 5.9% (Table 2).
Table 2: Raw GPG: Net Hourly Wages in Euro in Italy (2010)
Whole Sample Male Wages Female Wages Raw
(9,787 Observations) (5,397 Observations) (4,390 Observations) GPG
9.980 10.260 9.652 5.926%
A small GPG in gross hourly wage does not imply a thin overall income inequality between
women and men within the economy. When considering the gross annual income instead of the
hourly wage, the differential increases significantly due to the lower number of hours worked by
female employees. Moreover, besides the GPG and the gender gap in paid hours, it is important to
consider gender gaps in employment, as these also contribute substantially to increase the difference
in average earnings of women versus men. That is because in countries where the female employment
rate is particularly low, women who chose to work may decide so due to their higher job profile
and earnings expectations. To give a complete picture of the GPG, Eurostat has developed a new
synthetic indicator called Gender overall earnings gap. This measures the impact of three combined
factors (hourly earnings, hours paid and employment rate) on the average earnings of all men of
working age compared to women. Eurostat (2015) estimates the 2010 Gender overall earnings gap
at 44.3% in Italy, and at 41,1% in Europe. At EU level, the Gender overall earnings gap was
driven mostly by the GPG (contribution of 37.0%) and the gender employment gap (contribution
of 35.0%), with minor contribution of gender gap in paid hours (28.0%). In Italy the gender
gap in employment rates was the main contributor to the total earnings gap (contribution of
65.0%), followed by the gender gap in paid hours (26.0%) and by the GPG (contribution of 9.0%)
(Eurostat 2015). Although the GPG in hourly wages is only a small part of the overall income
inequality by gender in Italy, it is precisely the analysis of that small difference which brings out
discrimination from the data. As Becker (1985) emphasized, large market discrimination is not
required to understand why the gender gap in earnings traditionally has been enormous. Even
small amounts of discrimination against women can cause huge differences in wages.
We exactly intend to prove that recruitment carried out by public contest can reverse the gender
wage gap (GPG) among young employees because public contests are merit-based and gender-fair
selection methods, that is without (or with a lower) wage discrimination. To achieve our purpose
we focus on the estimates of disparity in hourly wages that persists when employed women and
men are similar as regards personal and job characteristics. This gap is of special interest for
discrimination search, since this wage disparity cannot be justified on grounds of productivity.
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The base for the following analysis is the estimation of a Mincer wage equation. There has been
much debate about what variables one should enter into the earnings functions used in studies of
the gender wage differential (Antonj and Blank, 1999). The standard Mincer equation including
experience and schooling is typically augmented by factors as human capital, employment, personal
and family background characteristics (Prokos and Padavic, 2005).
We consider as human capital variables: years of education, dummy variables for the kind of
high school attended, dummy variable for the mark gained in the high school graduation exam.
The employment variables include actual work experience, as well as experience squared as an
indicator of the diminishing marginal utility of the work experience, tenure (years with present
employer), dummy variables for the employment sector and job characteristics and, when appro-
priate, a dummy variable for the size of the firm where the respondent works. Family background
characteristics include mother’s and father’s education and employment status when the individ-
ual was 14 years of age. Personal characteristics include family status and sex when appropriate.
A complete list of the variables included in the analysis along with their coding is provided in
Appendix A.
Table 3 reports the estimation results of the log of the hourly wage for different samples.
Among the explanatory variables there is the dummy Public Contest, which takes the value 1 if
the individual has been hired by public contest and zero otherwise. We expect to find that the
estimated coefficient for Public Contest is significantly positive indicating that hiring carried out
by public contest has a positive effect on earnings.
Results in Table 3 (column 1) show that recruitment carried out by public contest has a positive
effect on wages. The recruitment through public contest has a sizeable positive effect on earnings
and the dummy Public Contest emerges as the most important among the considered variables to
predict earnings. In the full sample of individuals aged 18-64 the wage premium for the public-
contest selection is 13.0% . The coefficient of the variable Female, negative and significant, confirms
the usual results of the literature: being a woman reduces earnings of 7.9%. But the coefficient for
the interaction term Contsex 5, positive and significant, shows that female employees receive from
the public-contest selection a wage prize even higher than the gender penalty (8.7%). The results
presented in Table 3 also show that, as usual, age, experience, education and tenure positively
impact on wages. Among the regressors we consider also a dummy variable for being or not
overeducated in the actual job. The coefficient of the variable Not − overeducated, positive and
5The variable Contsex is given by the interaction between the variables Female and Public Contest.
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significant confirms the that individuals matched to a job in which the educational qualification is
a requirement have higher wages than individuals matched to a job in which the qualification is not
a necessary requirement. Both theoretical literature and empirical evidence on the GPG indicate
that small differences in the early career greatly expand with age and give rise to large lifelong
observed gender disparity in earnings. As the positive effect of public-contest selection impacts to
a greater extent on early wages, we expect to find a stronger effect of public-contest recruitment
among young people, by taking the early age as a proxy for the early career.
The results in column 2 of Table 3 also show that the positive effect on wages of recruitments
carried out by public contest is stronger in the early career (that is among young employees).
The positive effect of recruitment through public contest is higher among young employees: their
earnings increase by 15.8% if individuals are selected by public contest (compared to the non-
selected) . The coefficient of the variable Female, negative and significant, reduces the earnings of
young employees of 2.5%. But the coefficient of the variable Contsex, positive and significant, shows
that the premium received by female employees for the public-contest selection is much higher:
12.5%. As public contests are less discretionary than other private methods of recruitment, they are
preferred by women (all else equal) because they can reduce gender discrimination. Consequently,
we expect that the positive effect on wages of recruitment carried out by public contest is stronger
for women than for men, as shown in Table 4.
The dummy Public Contest is more important for women than for men in both the young
sample and in the full sample (respectively 0.202 vs. 0.122 and 0.246 vs. 0.160). The regression
results for the wage equations by recruitment method and gender are presented in Appendix B
(Table B1 and Table B2).
5 Public contests are gender-fair and merit-based selection meth-
ods
In the previous section we have found evidence that hiring carried out by public contest have a
positive effect on earnings, more prominent for female and young employees. In this section we use
the Oaxaca-Blinder (1973) standard methodology to decompose the GPG. Our aim is to estimate
the GPG all else equal, and to find evidence of gender discrimination in our data (if any). We expect
that both the GPG and discrimination are lower among public-contest selected employees. That
is because we assume that public contests are merit-based and gender-fair, whereas other private
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Table 4: Wage Regression by Age and Gender.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables Individuals Aged Individuals Aged Individuals Aged Individuals Aged
18-64. Male Sample 18-64. Female Sample 18-34. Male Sample 18-34. Female Sample
Public Contest 0.122*** 0.202*** 0.160*** 0.246***
(0.0158) (0.0172) (0.0365) (0.0345)
Exper 0.0251*** 0.0173*** 0.0186** 0.00736
(0.00236) (0.00266) (0.00914) (0.0103)
Exper2 -0.000370*** -0.000266*** -0.000845 -6.13e-05
(4.97e-05) (5.85e-05) (0.000548) (0.000616)
Tenure 0.00415*** 0.00433*** 0.0138*** 0.0135***
(0.000834) (0.00104) (0.00409) (0.00484)
Educ 0.0214*** 0.0331*** 0.00414 0.0238***
(0.00262) (0.00308) (0.00451) (0.00558)
Ageychild -0.00122 -0.00140 -0.00237 -0.000920
(0.000824) (0.000958) (0.00251) (0.00206)
Childrdummy 0.0612** 0.100*** 0.0993 0.101
(0.0279) (0.0294) (0.0930) (0.0714)
Degree 0.126*** 0.0433** 0.0570 0.0182
(0.0224) (0.0213) (0.0381) (0.0370)
Max-D-mark 0.116*** 0.0403 0.152** 0.0292
(0.0335) (0.0259) (0.0613) (0.0459)
Married 0.0324 0.0499*** 0.0598 0.0545
(0.0217) (0.0187) (0.0445) (0.0352)
Homeowner 0.0477** 0.0319 0.0544* 0.0157
(0.0197) (0.0211) (0.0300) (0.0350)
Child-care-aid 0.00961 -0.0585** -0.0276 -0.0447
(0.0273) (0.0264) (0.0969) (0.0715)
Not-overeducated 0.0483*** 0.106*** 0.00251 0.0479*
(0.0137) (0.0165) (0.0215) (0.0268)
Constant 1.304*** 1.132*** 1.546*** 1.231***
(0.0576) (0.0632) (0.0909) (0.112)
Observations 5,397 4,39 2,22 1,905
R-squared 0.272 0.294 0.061 0.109
The regression includes all variables used in the model and described in Appendix A, but the table
shows only the most significant. Robust standard errors in parentheses - ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05,
∗p < 0.1
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methods of recruitment are more discretionary and unregulated, in so creating the conditions for
gender discrimination to flourish. By using the implicit assumptions in Oaxaca and Blinder (1973)
we decompose the wage differential in three distinct parts; endowments, coefficients and interaction
effect:
ln(W¯M )− ln(W¯F ) = X¯ ′M βˆM − X¯
′
F βˆF (1)
= (X¯
′
M − X¯
′
F )βˆF + X¯
′
F (βˆM − βˆF ) + (X¯
′
M − X¯
′
F )(βˆM − βˆF ) (2)
where (W¯M , W¯F ) is the average wage for the male and female samples, respectively, with X¯G and
βˆG being (K × 1) vectors of average characteristics and estimated coefficients for G = (F,M),
where G = F is for female and G = M is for male. The first term is the endowments effect that
evaluates the GPG in terms of characteristics at the rate of return of the characteristics of women.
As different endowments should have different effects on earnings, the difference in endowments
represents the explained component in the Oaxaca three-fold decomposition. The second term is
the coefficients effect evaluating the GPG in terms of different returns for women characteristics. As
the same endowments should have the same effect on earnings for both men and women, coefficients
should not differ by gender, which is why this term represents the unexplained part of the GPG. If
the GPG depends mainly on the difference on characteristics returns, this may indicate the presence
of gender discrimination. Last, the third term is the interaction effect that takes into account the
simultaneous existence of differences in endowments and coefficients by gender.
Table 5 shows an important result, that is, recruitment carried out by public contest signifi-
cantly reverses the GPG among young employees. In the young sample of individuals recruited by
public contest our data show a strong GPG in favor of women (-17.4%). Moreover, this wage gap
is all explained by endowments, i.e. by the fact that women have better observable characteris-
tics than men. The component for discrimination (coefficients) is not significant; given the same
observable characteristics for men and women, the difference in coefficients by gender is negligible
(not statistically significant). Conversely, in the sample of young individuals not hired by public
contest, the GPG is not significantly different from zero. In this case too, the component coefficients
is not significant; meaning that there is no discrimination in pay at the early career. Instead, the
coefficient for endowment is significant and negative, meaning that women have better observable
characteristics than men. As we know from the literature, even small differences at the start may
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expand greatly in the career path and give rise to large lifelong GPGs.
Our data show (Table 5) that the reversal of the GPG observed among public-contest selected
young employees vanishes in the full sample of individuals aged 18-64 even if they are recruited by
public contest. This is because the career path erodes the head start that young women receive by
public-contest recruitment.
Table 5: Log Hourly Wages by Age, Gender and Method of Recruitment and Oaxaca Decomposition
of the GPG.
Log- Hourly Wages Coefficient P > |z|
Public-Contest Selected Employees - Full Sample 18-64 (3,203 Observations)
Differential
Male Wages (Log- Hourly Wages) 2,379393 0
Female Wages (Log- Hourly Wages) 2,381921 0
Difference -0,002528 0,876
Decomposition
Endowments -0,003303 0,735
Coefficients 0,0068167 0,672
Interaction -0,006042 0,54
Employees Not Selected by Public Contest Full Sample 18 - 64 (6,584 Observations)
Differential
Male Wages (Log- Hourly Wages) 2,004464 0
Female Wages (Log- Hourly Wages) 1,92555 0
Difference 0,0789141 0
Decomposition
Endowments -0,022433 0,051
Coefficients 0,0637489 0
Interaction 0,0375982 0,002
Public-Contest Selected Employees Young Sample 18-34 (491 Observations)
Differential
Male Wages (Log- Hourly Wages) 2,031359 0
Female Wages (Log- Hourly Wages) 2,191992 0
Difference -0,160632 0,001
Decomposition
Endowments -0,131036 0
Coefficients -0,100022 0,15
Interaction 0,0704257 0,256
Employees Not Selected by Public Contest Young Sample 18-34 (3,634 Observations)
Differential
Male Wages (Log- Hourly Wages) 1,843471 0
Female Wages (Log- Hourly Wages) 1,850177 0
Difference -0,006706 0,703
Decomposition
Endowments -0,07368 0
Coefficients 0,022447 0,257
Interaction 0,0445273 0,015
Statistically significant values in bold
∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
Although the best female productive characteristics are confirmed by a positive and significant
coefficient for endowments in the full sample too, whenever the initial advantage of young women
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is reabsorbed from the career path, the reversal vanishes and the GPG becomes not significantly
different from zero.
Among employees not hired by public contest, the GPG becomes positive and signifcant (7.6%),
and is almost entirely due to coefficients, that is to discrimination in the career path. Hence, in
the case of non public-contest recruitment, the discriminatory part containing discrimination of the
GPG is highly significant and makes up more than 80% of the gap of the full sample, while it is
not significant among people in early careers.
6 Double sample selection. Model and Results
In the previous sections we find a reversal of the GPG in favor of women among public-contest
selected young employees. We argue that the reversal is due to the fairness of the public-contest
selection mechanism, that is, among public-contest selected employees women’s characteristics are
rewarded as men’s ones. In order to prove this statement, we must control for any possible selection
bias that may occur when the selection process into the considered subsample is not random and
may be different for male and female workers (Heckman 1979). Earnings are observed only for the
sector in which the individual is employed in (sector where the entry depends or not on a public
contest) and thus the sectoral earnings equations cannot be consistently estimated using ordinary
least squares regression due to the endogeneity of sectoral choice (often referred to as selection
bias). The selection rule depends on two individual decisions; the decision to be employed and the
sectoral choice (recruitment by public contest or not). Our setup refers to the case of a censored
probit, i.e. partial partial observability by the definition of Meng and Schmidt (1985); the output of
the first decision is always observed, but the output of the second decision is observed if and only if
the individual participates in employment. In this paper, we do not take into account the selectivity
bias that can stem from the participation in the labor market. We consider only individuals that
have already chosen to participate in the labor market. We are aware of the fact that the selectivity
bias that can stem from the participation to the labor force may be particularly relevant in Italy
given the low female participation into the labor market (see De la Rica et al. 2008; Olivetti and
Petrongolo 2008; Centra and Cutillo 2009). However, as this participation bias is well known for the
Italian case, in this paper we prefer to focus on the double selection of employment and recruitment
decisions only; i.e. the decision to accept a wage offer6 (yes or no) and the decision to compete
6The observation of the wage may depend either from the decision of the employee to accept or not a job offer, or
from the firm decision to hire or not the candidate. We assume that the selection into employment depends only on
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in public contests (yes or no). The double selection approach allows simultaneous estimations of
the worker’s participation to employment and the employee’s recruitment decision either for public-
contest selected individuals or for employees not selected by public contest. The selection into wage
work may depend on some positive factors such as individual ability, or motivation, or education
quality, and so on that raise both the probability of being employed and wages, but are omitted
in the estimates of earnings equation because they are unobservable in the data. Moreover, we
need to correct for any possible endogeneity bias that may result when the condition of individuals
recruited by public contest also depend on individuals decisions such as to accept to participate in
a contest. The selection rules are described by the following relations:
Employment Selection: Y ∗iE = Z
′
iγ + uiE (3)
Public-Contest Selection: Y ∗iPC = Q
′
iα+ uiPC (4)
where Y ∗iE represents the unobserved indexes of that individual i uses to make the decision to
work or not and Y ∗iPC represents the unobserved indexes of utility that individual i uses to make the
decision to use the channel of public contests; with Zi and Qi being (Kz × 1) and (KQ× 1) vectors
of explanatory variables, respectively; and the ui are assumed to be N(0, 1) with cov(uE , uPC) = ρ.
The model is completed with wage equations for paid-employees in both sectors. Moreover, we
estimate the model separately for the female and the male sample. The model can be consistently
estimated by Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE). Yet, the number of parameters to be esti-
mated is rather large and the estimates we obtained by FMLE are unreliable. Therefore, we follow
Tunali (1986) and Sorensen (1989) that extend the Heckman (1976, 1979), and Lee (1979, 1983)
procedure by including selectivity coefficients as explanatory variables in the wage regression. The
method proposed by Tunali (1986) is a two-step procedure that at the first step makes use of MLE
for equations (2) and (3) to obtain consistent estimates of the correction (selectivity) terms; λ¯E
and λ¯PC . This procedure allows wages to be generated through multiple selection rules explicitly
recognizing the roles of both the work decision and the recruitment decision for the determination
of the individual’s employment status. In Appendix B, Table B3 and Table B4, the estimation
results of the bivariate probit regression for men and women are outlined. Adding the selection
terms λ¯E and λ¯PC to the earnings equations allows us to consistently estimate the earnings for
the individual decision and not on the firm decision.
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public-contest and non-public-contest selected, respectively (Lee 1983; Tunali 1986):
ln(W¯mG ) = X¯
m′
G βˆ
m
G + δˆ
m
E,Gλ¯
m
E,G + δˆ
m
PC,Gλ¯
m
PC,G (5)
where m = (PC,NPC); m = PC is for individuals selected by contest and m = NPC is for
individuals not selected by public not selected by public contest. Following Beblo et al. (2003),
when considering selection in the sample, the decomposition expression (1) becomes:
ln(W¯mM )− ln(W¯mF ) = X¯m
′
M βˆ
m
M − X¯m
′
F βˆ
m
F (6)
= (X¯m
′
M − X¯m
′
F )βˆ
m
F + X¯
m′
F (βˆ
m
M − βˆmF ) + (X¯m
′
M − X¯m
′
F )(βˆ
m
M − βˆmF ) (7)
+ (δˆmM,Eλ¯
m
M,E − δˆmF,Eλ¯mF,E) + (δˆmM,PC λ¯mM,PC − δˆmF,PC λ¯mF,PC) (8)
Public-contest selected employees (both men and women) may benefit from a double selection
mechanism. If the selection effect of both the work decision and the recruitment decision is sig-
nificant and positive, women and men selected by public contest would have higher unobserved
characteristics and wages than women and men with the same observed characteristics not selected
by public contest. We present in Table 6 definitions and values of the four selection variables we
consider in this study, for both men and women in the full sample. Due to data restrictions, we
are not able to estimate the selection effects for the young sample, 18-34 years. We study first the
sign of λ’s in the sample of individuals selected by public contest (λPCE and λ
PC
PC). The positive
sign of the coefficient λPCE indicates the presence of sample selection bias, that is, individuals in
employment are paid more than otherwise observationally identical unemployed individuals. This
means that those unobserved characteristics raising the probability of being employed also increase
wages. We find evidence that women recruited by public contest have higher positive unobserved
characteristics and earnings than other women with similar observed characteristics and actually
unemployed would have obtained if they were recruited by public contest.
The positive sign of the coefficient λPCPC indicates that those unobserved positive characteristics
raising the probability of winning a contest also increase wages. That is, individuals who are
actually recruited by public contest have higher positive unobserved characteristics and wages than
individuals not recruited by public contest would have obtained if they were recruited by public
contest.
This bias is stronger for men, due to their higher employment rate that includes among employ-
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Table 6: Selection Variables, Definition and Values
Women Men
λPCE
measures the selection bias from the 0.1865278*** 0.3331715
work decision for those selected by public contest
λPCPC
measures the selection bias from the 0.2927062*** 0.3940814*
recruitment decision for those selected by public contest
Observations 1,718 1,485
λNPCE
measures the selection bias from the 0.1478356 -0.1475796
work decision for those NOT selected by public contest
λNPCPC
measures the selection bias from the -0.331799*** -0.3383643***
recruitment decision for those NOT selected by public contest
Observations 2,672 3,912
Statistically significant values in bold
∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
ees not selected by public contest also individuals with a very low occupational profile (finding a
job is men’s primary responsibility). As only the very best men are selected by public contest, the
difference in positive unobserved characteristics and wages is higher for men than for women. As
caretaking is women’s primary responsibility, women with low occupational profiles are more likely
to be out of employment (instead of employees not selected by public contest) due to female higher
opportunity cost of time. We turn now to study the sign of λ’s in the sample of individuals not
selected by public public contest (λNPCE and λ
NPC
PC ). The selectivity variable λ
NPC
E λ
NPC
E is not
statistically significant, that is employees not selected by public contest have near the same unob-
served characteristics and wage offers than unemployed individuals. On the contrary, as expected,
the selectivity variable λNPCPC is negative and statistically significant, that is employees recruited
without public contest have lower levels of positive unobserved characteristics and wage offers than
individuals actually selected by public contest.
Our results in Table 6 strengthen the results found in Section 5; Public contests are merit-
based selection methods. The value of λPCE (female coefficient) in Table 6, positive and significant,
confirms that women selected by contest have better unobserved characteristics than unemployed
women. Moreover, the value of λPCPC , positive and significant, confirms that women selected by
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public contest have better unobserved characteristics than women not selected by public contest. As
expected, the female coefficient of λNPCPC , negative and significant, provides a further confirmation
of the fact that public contest is a merit-based selection method; indeed women not selected by
public contest have worse unobserved characteristics. The values of the male coefficients λPCPC and
λNPCPC , positive and significant the first, negative and significant the second, confirm the fact that
public contest is a merit-based selection methods also for men.
Last, the value of λPCE positive and significant for women and not significant for men, confirms
once again that women have better unobserved characteristics than men among public-contest
selected employees.
In the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition of the GPG among public-contest selected employees the
component for discrimination (coefficients) is never significant, either with or without selection. In
Table 5 (Oaxaca without selection) discrimination is not statistically significant either for the full
sample of individuals aged 18-64 or for the young sample. Also in Table 7 (Oaxaca with selection)
the coefficient for discrimination is not significant among public-contest selected employees (full
sample). Therefore, controlling for selection confirms the results of Section 5. As in both cases,
with and without selection, the discrimination coefficient turns out to be not statistically significant,
public contests are gender-fair selection methods.
When we look at the employees not selected by public contest (Table 5, Oaxaca without selec-
tion), the coefficient for discrimination is significant and causes a significant GPG (7.6%) for the
full sample of individuals aged 18-64. Also in Table 7 (Oaxaca with selection) the coefficient for dis-
crimination is positive and significant among employees not selected by public contest. Therefore,
also in this case, we confirm the findings of Section 5; in the case of non public-contest recruitment,
the labor market is not a gender-fair selection mechanism.
Table 7: Oaxaca Decomposition of the GPG by Method of Recruitment (with Selection)
Employees Not Selected Public-Contest
by Public Contest Selected Employees
Full Sample 18-64 Full Sample 18-64
(6,584 Observations) (3,203 Observations)
Log. Hourly Wages Coefficient P > |z| Coefficient P > |z|
Endowments -0.0345393 0.00202612 0.01229034 0.42537277
Coefficients 0.31504413 0.08295 -0.17083547 0.51629527
Interaction 0.0442252 0.00058638 -0.00467105 0.7482381
λE -0.22854093 0.24811172 -0.05201955 0.01649974
λPC -0.01727497 0.7254131 0.2127077 0.39046751
Statistically significant values in bold
∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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7 Conclusion
We study the effect of hiring methods on earnings and we show that public-contest selection reduces
the conditions for gender discrimination to flourish. We argue that public contests are merit-based
and gender-fair mechanisms for performance appraisal. They are merit-based because employees
hired by public contest hold better observable and unobservable characteristics than unselected
employees. They are gender-fair because among public-contest selected employees women’s char-
acteristics are rewarded as men’s ones, in so indicating the absence of gender discrimination. The
GPG, if any, only depends on the difference in women’s and men’s characteristics. We prove that
recruitment carried out by public contests erases the GPG in the full sample of individuals aged
18-64, and even reverse the gap in favor of women among young employees. To the best of our
knowledge, no other research establishes such a relationship between recruitment procedures and
the reversal of the GPG. This merit-based procedure picks out the most deserving participants
because it is less discretionary and more regulated by law than other screening devices.
Our data show that the positive effect of public-contest selection impacts to a greater extent in
the early career. Among young employees earnings increase of 15.8% if individuals are selected by
public contest (compared to the non-selected). Moreover, the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition of the
GPG shows that discrimination is lower (or even not statistically significant) among public-contest
selected employees. Hence, public contests are merit-based and gender-fair selection methods.
The implication is that we observe in the young sample of individuals recruited by public contest
a strong wage gap in favor of women (-17.4%). Moreover, this gap is all explained by endowments,
i.e. by the fact that women have better observable characteristics than men. The component for
discrimination (coefficients) is not significant; if men had the same productive characteristics than
women, they would have their own wages. Our data also show that the reversal of the GPG observed
among public-contest selected young employees vanishes among individuals aged 18-64, even if they
are recruited by public contest. This is because the career path erodes the head start that young
women receive by public-contest recruitment. The best female characteristics are confirmed by a
positive and significant coefficient for endowments in the full sample too, but whenever the initial
advantage of young women is reabsorbed from the career path, the GPG becomes not significantly
different from zero. On the contrary, among employees not hired by public contest the GPG is
positive and significant (7.6%), and it is entirely due to coefficients, that is to discrimination in
the career path. By comparing the values of coefficients in the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition we
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definitely draw the conclusion that public-contest recruitment is a gender-fair screening device.
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Appendix A: Definition of Variables
Table A1: Definition of Variables
Variable Name Definition
Dependent Variables
Work Decision One if the respective individual decided to work for pay, zero if unemployed
Public Contest One if the respective individual was selected by public contest, zero otherwise
Net Hourly Wages Hourly wages in Euros and net of taxes and social security contributions
Independent Variables
Female One if the respective individual is a woman, zero otherwise
Contsex Interactive effect of Public Contest and Female, i.e. one if employee
entered via public contests in current job and is female, zero otherwise
Exper Number of years of prior work experience
Exper2 Exper squared
Tenure Number of years worked for current employer
Educ Number of years of schooling completed
Degree One if completed a degree, zero otherwise
High School One if highest education was high school, zero otherwise
Primary Education One if highest education obtained was primary education, zero otherwise
Secondary Education One if highest degree obtained was secondary education, zero otherwise
Managers Intellectual professions; scientific, and highly specialized occupations
Intermediate Professions Intermediary positions in commercial, technical or administrative sectors,
health services, technicians.
White-collar Workers Commercial, technical and administrative employees and clerks.
Age Age of individual (in years)
Age5064 One if age is between 50 and sixty years, zero otherwise
Big Firm One if firm has at least 10,000 workers, zero otherwise
Public One if firm is a publicly owned firm, zero otherwise
Private One if firm is a privately owned firm, zero otherwise
City One if individual is located in a metropolitan area, zero otherwise
Full-time One if worked at least 1,840 hours last year, zero otherwise
Married One if married, zero otherwise
Childrdummy One if individual has at least one child, zero otherwise
Ageychild Age of youngest child
Not-Overeducated One if education is required to perform the job, zero otherwise
Regional Dummies 19 regional dummies for the region where the current job is located,
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used as controls in the earning equation and 19 regional dummies for
the region of residence, used as controls in the selection equations
North One if individual lives and works in the North of Italy, zero otherwise
Centre One if individual lives and works in the Centre of Italy, zero otherwise
Father College Degree One if employee’s father possesses a university degree, zero otherwise
Mother College Degree One if employee’s mother possesses a university degree, zero otherwise
Father Secondary Degree One if employee’s father possesses an high school degree, zero otherwise
Mother Secondary Degree One if employee’s mother possesses an high school degree, zero otherwise
Father in Work One if employee’s father was working when employee was 14, zero otherwise
Father Self-employed One if employee’s father was working as self-employed when employee was 14,
zero otherwise
Father Manager One if employee’s father was a manager when employee was 14, zero otherwise
Father Executive Cadre One if employee’s father was an executive cadre when employee was 14, zero otherwise
Father White Collar One if employee’s father was a white collar when employee was 14, zero otherwise
Mother in Work One if employee’s mother was working when employee was 14, zero otherwise
Mother Self-employed One if employee’s mother was working as self-employed when
employee was 14, zero otherwise
Mother Manager One if employee’s mother was a manager when employee was 14, zero otherwise
Mother Executive Cadre One if employee’s mother was an executive cadre when employee
was 14; zero otherwise
Mother White Collar One if employee’s mother was a white collar when employee was 14,
zero otherwise
Sectoral Dummies 21 sectoral dummies for the type of economic activity performed
according to the ATECO 2007 Classification of Economic Activity used
as controls in the earnings equation
Max-D-mark One if employee achieved the maximum degree mark, zero otherwise
Homeowner One if employee owns a house, zero otherwise
Child-care-aid One if aid for child care is available to employee, zero otherwise
Partner-works One if partner is employed, zero otherwise
Eng-skill One if individual is able to communicate in English, zero otherwise
Italian One if individual is Italian, zero otherwise
Selection Variables
λPCE Measures the selection bias from the work decision for those selected by public contest
λPCPC Measures the selection bias from the recruitment decision for those selected
by public contest.
λNPCE Measures the selection bias from the work decision for those not selected by
23
public contest
λNPCPC Measures the selection bias from the recruitment decision for those not selected
by public contest
24
Appendix B: Estimation results
Table B1: Wage Regression. Sample of Public-Contest Selected Individuals by Gender
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Women Men
Exper 0.0282*** 0.0403***
(0.00637) (0.0101)
Exper2 -4.87E-05 -0.000385***
(8.31E-05) (0.000106)
Tenure 0.00286** 0.00218
(0.00137) (0.00162)
Educ 0.0962*** 0.0857***
(0.0156) (0.025)
Age-y-child -0.00308** -0.00142
(0.0013) (0.00136)
Childrdummy 0.0831** 0.102**
(0.0388) (0.0443)
Degree 0.0289 0.104***
(0.026) (0.0359)
Maximum-d-mark 0.0741*** 0.110**
(0.0284) (0.0442)
Married 0.0573** -0.0308
(0.0259) (0.044)
Homeowner 0.0608** 0.0918**
(0.0308) (0.04)
Child-care-aid -0.0537 0.076
(0.0357) (0.0554)
λPCE 0.1865*** 0.3332
(0.0707) (0.422)
λPCPC 0.2927*** 0.3941*
(0.107) (0.216)
Constant -0.306 -0.442
(0.481) (0.892)
Observations 1,718 1,485
R-squared 0.248 0.251
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table B2: Wage Regression. Sample of Not-Public-Contest Selected Individuals by Gender
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Women Men
Exper 0.00978** 0.0154***
(0.00419) (0.00301)
Exper2 -0.000252*** -0.000297***
(9.40E-05) (6.19E-05)
Tenure 0.00364** 0.00409***
(0.00157) (0.000995)
Educ 0.00984 -0.00388
(0.0109) (0.00723)
Age-y-child -0.00250* -0.00171
(0.00148) (0.00116)
Childrdummy 0.046 0.0293
(0.0578) (0.0383)
Degree -0.0287 0.0576*
(0.0331) (0.03)
Maximum-d-mark 0.00873 0.0843*
(0.0436) (0.0495)
Married 0.0724** 0.047
(0.0304) (0.0463)
Homeowner 0.0216 0.0447**
(0.0278) (0.0225)
Child-care-aid -0.0392 0.0179
(0.04) (0.0361)
λNPCE 0.1478 -0.1476
(0.191) (0.153)
λNPCPC -0.3318*** -0.3384***
(0.0636) (0.0943)
Constant 1.148*** 1.715***
(0.405) (0.24)
Observations 2,672 3,912
R-squared 0.146 0.196
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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The two binary outcomes, Public Contest and Employment, are strongly positively correlated; with
ρ = 0.42. Hence, the two decisions need to be modeled jointly. In Table B3, we estimate via a bivariate
probit regression, the decision to enter employment via public contest and the decision to become employed.
The parameter ρ measuring the correlation of the residuals from the two models shows that the unobservable
parts of the two equations are strongly correlated for both, men and women. For the female sample, ρ equals
to 0.48 and is highly statistically significant (log likelihood ratio, LLR, statistic = 22.19). Similarly, also the
ρ for the male sample, amounting to 0.92, is highly statistically significant with LLR statistic equal to 0.33.
The coefficient of ρ is positive in either case pointing to the fact that the unobservable components of the
two decisions are positively correlated. The LLR test (see Table B4) shows that the two equations are not
independent and thus underlines the importance of taking both decisions into account. In both cases, the
null hypothesis, H0 : ρ = 0, is rejected at a 1% level of significance, with the corresponding χ2−statistics
going from 1,341.57 for the male estimation to 1,526.47 for the female estimation. Hence, the results suggests
that there are positive and significant selection or truncation effects and those who select into public-contest
employment get higher wages than a randomly chosen individual not selected into public-contest recruitment
with a similar set of characteristics would get.
Table B4: Log Likelihood Test of Independent Equations, H0 : ρ = 0:
χ2−statistics -2LL LLR statistics7 Prob > χ2
Women 1,526.47 14,441.02 22.19 0.0000
(unrestricted model)
14,463.21
(restricted model)
Men 1,341.57 14,075.45 30.327 0.0000
(unrestricted model)
14,105.78
(restricted model)
28
Appendix C: Methodological issues
The probabilities of observing a positive labor income given recruitment through public contests or
recruitment through other channels are given below:
Pr(Y ∗E > 0, Y
∗
PC > 0) = Pr(uE > −Z
′
γ, uPC > −Q′α) = G(Z ′γ,Q′α, ρ) (9)
Pr(Y ∗E > 0, Y
∗
PC ≤ 0) = Pr(uE > −Z
′
γ, uPC ≤ −Q′α) = G(Z ′γ,−Q′α,−ρ) (10)
where G(.) is the standard bivariate normal distribution and ρ is the correlation coefficient between the
two selection rules. Under the assumption that the two selection rules are not independent, that is ρ 6= 0,
maximum likelihood of the bivariate probit leads to the following selection terms for public-contest selected
employees, m = PC:
λPCE =
f(Z
′
γ)F [Q
′
α−ρZ′γ√
1−ρ2 ]
G(Z ′γ,Q′α, ρ)
(11)
λPCPC =
f(Q
′
α)F [Z
′
γ−ρQ′α√
1−ρ2 ]
G(Z ′γ,Q′α, ρ)
(12)
Similarly, for the subsample of non-public-contest selected individuals, m = NPC, the corresponding selec-
tion terms are given by:
λNPCE =
f(Z
′
γ)F [−Q
′
α−ρZ′γ√
1−ρ2 ]
G(Z ′γ,−Q′α,−ρ) (13)
λNPCPC =
f(Q
′
α)F [Z
′
γ−ρQ′α√
1−ρ2 ]
G(Z ′γ,−Q′α,−ρ) (14)
f(.) is the standard normal density, while F (.) is the standard normal distribution and ρ is the correlation
coefficient between the two selection rules.
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